CyberSureWatch · sample

This is the monthly report you receive

A completely fictional example: score, changes, new alerts, remediation and detailed controls. The presentation is identical to the client report.

CyberSure

CyberSure

External cyber monitoring

Sample · fictional

Monthly security report

Exemple Logistique (fictional company)

October 2026

85/100 · B

Good

Overall security score

Organisation
Exemple Logistique (fictional company)
Plan
Pro Monitoring
Reporting period
October 2026
Last scan
28 October 2026
Domains analysed
1
Subdomains identified
3
Tests performed
130
Report issued on
2 November 2026

Scope analysed

DomainScan dateSubdomainsScore
exemple-logistique.be28 October 20263 · portail.exemple-logistique.be, webmail.exemple-logistique.be, www.exemple-logistique.be85
Sample based on a fictional company: no real data or real systems were analysed.
CyberSure · info@cybersure.be · +32 495 75 85 70 · BCE BE 1005.721.833
01

Summary

Period overview

0

Critical

1

High

1

Medium

1

Low

0

Info

2

Resolved

5

scan(s) during the period

36

compliant checks

4

checks requiring correction

Accès à distance exposés (1)

VPN, pare-feux, bureau à distance and consoles visibles depuis Internet : premier vecteur d'entrée des rançongiciels. À traiter en priorité : MFA, mises à jour and accès restreint par IP. Ces indices passifs sont à confirmer, aucun test n'a été envoyé vers l'équipement.

  • HighRemote Desktop (RDP) service exposed (port 3389)exemple-logistique.be

Vulnerability tracking register

Preuve de diligence : constats validés, délais de correction and respect des délais cibles (critique 7 j, élevée 30 j, moyenne 90 j, faible 180 j).

3

Ouverts

6

Resolved

12 j

Délai moyen

0

Hors délai

0

Exploités activement

Registre des actifs externes

Inventaire de ce que l'entreprise expose sur Internet : premier document demandé lors d'un audit NIS 2, exportable.

4

Assets

4

Contrôle prouvé

1

Certificat < 30 j

0

Hébergé hors UE

0

Jamais analysé

Fournisseurs critiques

Indicateurs publics sur des tiers, non validés par eux : base de dialogue avec vos fournisseurs (NIS 2, art. 21).

  • Hébergeur Web SA hebergeur-exemple.beRien de notable
  • Logiciel de facturation facturation-exemple.euÀ surveiller (2)

The situation is improving: two issues were resolved this month. The priority is to close the exposed Remote Desktop access, then move DMARC from monitoring to quarantine. The new portal must remain inventoried and protected by MFA.

Automated analysis, validated by an expert.

02

Issues to address (3)

Ranked from most to least severe, with the action plan

1. Remote Desktop (RDP) service exposed (port 3389)

High

Affected asset: exemple-logistique.be

L'adresse publique 192.0.2.24 expose le port 3389 sur Internet selon Shodan InternetDB. Il s'agit d'une donnée passive fictive dans ce spécimen.

Recommendation: Fermer ce port au pare-feu ou le restreindre à un VPN avec authentification multifacteur.

Why it matters: An Internet-accessible service (remote desktop, database, file sharing) is a common entry point for ransomware.

Where to fix it
Company firewall / router or server configuration at the hosting provider.
Who is involved
Your IT service provider or hosting provider.
Impact
Users accessing this service remotely will need to use a VPN: notify them.
Estimated time
30 minutes to a few hours

Steps

  1. Identify what the service is used for.
  2. If it is not needed, block it at the firewall.
  3. Otherwise, restrict it to a VPN or authorised IP addresses and enable strong authentication.
  4. Update the software.

Instructions to send to your service provider

« A service is exposed on the Internet at our IP address (see details). Please close it or restrict it to the VPN / authorised IP addresses, and check that it is up to date. »

Verify the fix: After remediation, the next scan must no longer list this port.

2. DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none)

Medium

Affected asset: exemple-logistique.be

Les e-mails usurpant le domaine ne sont ni rejetés ni mis en quarantaine.

Recommendation: Analyser les rapports, puis passer à p=quarantine and ensuite à p=reject.

Why it matters: DMARC is in monitoring-only mode: spoofed emails still get through.

Where to fix it
The domain's DNS zone, managed by the registrar (LWS, OVH, Combell, one.com…) or DNS provider (Cloudflare…).
Who is involved
The person managing your domain name (you, your web agency or your IT provider).
Impact
If a legitimate service does not meet SPF/DKIM alignment requirements, its emails will go to spam: check the reports first.
Estimated time
10 minutes

Steps

  1. Check the DMARC reports to ensure your legitimate outgoing emails pass.
  2. Replace p=none with p=quarantine, then p=reject.

Instructions to send to your service provider

« Please change our DMARC policy from p=none to p=quarantine and then p=reject after reviewing the reports. »

Verify the fix: The _dmarc record must contain p=quarantine or p=reject.

3. Content-Security-Policy security header missing

Low

Affected asset: exemple-logistique.be

Le navigateur ne reçoit pas de politique limitant les sources de contenu autorisées.

Recommendation: Déployer une politique CSP en mode Report-Only, la vérifier, puis l'appliquer.

Why it matters: These headers instruct the browser to block certain common attacks (clickjacking, content injection, HTTPS downgrade attacks).

Where to fix it
Web server or hosting configuration (hosting control panel, .htaccess, Nginx, Cloudflare, WordPress security plugin).
Who is involved
Your web agency, hosting provider or website developer.
Impact
Low risk, but testing is required: an overly strict CSP can break elements (videos, analytics tools). Add the headers one at a time.
Estimated time
30 minutes to 2 hours

Steps

  1. Add the headers in the server configuration, Cloudflare or a security plugin (WordPress).
  2. Start with Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, X-Frame-Options.
  3. Add Content-Security-Policy in Report-Only mode before enforcing it.
  4. Test all website pages.

Instructions to send to your service provider

« Please add the missing HTTP security headers to our website (HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, X-Frame-Options/CSP frame-ancestors, Permissions-Policy, CSP in Report-Only mode first) and check that the website still works afterwards. »

Verify the fix: Free tool: securityheaders.com should show a grade of A or B.

03

Checks performed

Every test performed, the observed value and the verdict — including when everything is compliant

exemple-logistique.be

Scan date 28 October 2026 · 85/100 · 130 tests
Email security (SPF, DMARC, DKIM)Requires correctionSPF present · DMARC present · DKIM detected · MX present
HTTPS and certificateCompliantHTTPS active (code 200) · HTTP→HTTPS redirect yes · certificate valid until 2027-01-15
Domain name expiryCompliantExpires on 2027-08-18
Website security headersRequires correction3/4 present · missing: content-security-policy
Known vulnerabilities (CVE / CVSS)CompliantDetected versions: WordPress 6.8.3 · 0 CVE connue(s)
Exposed sensitive filesCompliant19 paths tested, none exposed
Sensitive paths in robots.txtCompliantNo sensitive paths declared
Technical URLs in sitemap.xmlCompliantNo sensitive URLs published
crossdomain.xml policyCompliantNo file (ideal situation)
Public subdomainsCompliant3 subdomain(s) found in certificate logs
Exposed services and portsRequires correction192.0.2.24 : ports 80, 443, 3389 · 0 vulnérabilité(s) connue(s)
Exposed AI interfaces and remote accessCompliant12 characteristic ports not reported
Reputation (Google Safe Browsing)CompliantNo threats reported
Credential leaks (Hudson Rock)CompliantNo known stolen credentials
Advanced email settingsCompliantDKIM 2048 bits · MTA-STS yes · TLS-RPT yes
Spam blocklistsCompliantNo email servers to check
Domain name securityCompliantDNSSEC : Activé · CAA : letsencrypt.org · Verrou de transfert : Actif
Abandoned subdomainsCompliant3 subdomain(s) checked · 1 aliases · 0 abandoned
Exposed administration pagesCompliant6 addresses tested, none found
Public AI assistants and chatbotsCompliantNo recognised conversational assistant on the homepage
Centralised sign-in and cloud emailCompliantMicrosoft 365 · portail(s) visible(s) : portail.exemple-logistique.be
Trackers and consent (GDPR)Compliant1 tracker(s) · consent detected · 1 third-party service(s)
Cookie securityCompliant0 cookie(s) analysed
Website technologiesCompliantWordPress
HTTPS redirection and security.txtCompliantsecurity.txt published
Public website history (archive.org)CompliantFirst archive: 2018-04-12
Domains impersonating yoursCompliant24 variants tested · 0 registered
Public cloud storageCompliant12 names tested · 0 public storage location(s)
Routing protection (RPKI)Compliant1/1 network(s) signed
Malware hosting (URLhaus)CompliantNo known malicious address
SPF lookup count (DNS queries)Compliant3 lookup(s) out of 10 permitted
Keys and secrets in public codeCompliantNo secrets detected (page + 4 script(s))
Maintenance of detected softwareCompliant0/1 version(s) at end of life
Legal notices and privacyCompliantRequired information present
External script integrity (SRI)CompliantNo third-party resources loaded
Guaranteed email encryption (DANE)Requires correction0/1 server(s) with DANE · DNSSEC asset
IPv6 accessibilityCompliant2/2 accessible via IPv6
DNS server redundancyCompliantns1.exemple-dns.be, ns2.exemple-dns.be, ns3.exemple-dns.eu
Hosting country (GDPR)Compliant2/2 server(s) in the EU/EEA
Form submission destinationsCompliantNo external destinations

Email security (SPF, DMARC, DKIM)

Requires correction

Why it matters: Prevents fraudsters from sending emails impersonating your company (CEO fraud, fake invoices).

Method: Reading public DNS TXT records, _dmarc and common DKIM selectors.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.PT — Protective technologies

TestObserved resultVerdict
Mail server (MX)PresentCompliant
SPF published« v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all »Compliant
Strict SPF (-all)Rejection of unauthorised sendersCompliant
DMARC published« v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@exemple-logistique.be »Compliant
DMARC policy enforcedMonitoring only (p=none)Requires correction
DMARC reports (rua)ConfiguredCompliant
DKIM signatureDetected on a common selectorCompliant

HTTPS and certificate

Compliant

Why it matters: Ensures that communications with your website are encrypted and that visitors are genuinely connecting to you.

Method: Connecting to the website over HTTP then HTTPS and reading the published certificate.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.DS — Data Security

TestObserved resultVerdict
Website reachable over HTTPSYes (code 200)Compliant
HTTP → HTTPS redirectYesCompliant
Certificate validityValid until 2027-01-15 (20833 days)Compliant
HSTSmax-age=31536000; includeSubDomainsCompliant

Domain name expiry

Compliant

Why it matters: An expired domain takes your website and email offline and can be bought by a third party.

Method: Registry query (RDAP).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
Expiry date2027-08-18 (21048 days)Compliant

Website security headers

Requires correction

Why it matters: These settings instruct the browser to block common attacks (script injection, clickjacking, information theft).

Method: Reading the HTTP headers returned by the homepage.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.PT — Protective technologies

TestObserved resultVerdict
HSTS (HTTPS enforcement)max-age=31536000; includeSubDomainsCompliant
Content Security Policy (CSP)AbsentRequires correction
MIME type sniffing protection (nosniff)nosniffCompliant
Referrer Policystrict-origin-when-cross-originCompliant
Anti-clickjacking (X-Frame-Options)AbsentRequires correction
Browser Permissions PolicyAbsentRequires correction
No server version disclosed“nginx” without a versionCompliant

Known vulnerabilities (CVE / CVSS)

Compliant

Why it matters: Outdated software with a publicly disclosed vulnerability is the primary entry point for ransomware.

Method: Identification passive des versions (en-têtes, générateur de page) puis comparaison aux bases publiques de vulnérabilités (NVD via Shodan CVEDB, secours CIRCL du CERT luxembourgeois, catalogue officiel CISA KEV avec usage par rançongiciels, failles exploitées de l'ENISA (EUVD) and avertissements du CCB / CERT-BE).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.RA — Risk Assessment

TestObserved resultVerdict
Identifiable software and versionsWordPress 6.8.3Compliant
Known vulnerabilities for WordPress 6.8.3NoneCompliant
Known vulnerabilities associated with IP addresses0 CVECompliant
Actively exploited vulnerabilities (CISA KEV catalogue)NoneCompliant
Vulnerabilities used by ransomware (CISA KEV)NoneCompliant
Failles exploitées selon l'ENISA (base européenne EUVD)NoneCompliant
Avertissement récent du CCB / CERT-BE sur un logiciel détectéNoneCompliant

Exposed sensitive files

Compliant

Why it matters: Files left behind on the server can expose passwords, customer databases or source code.

Method: A simple request to each path, with no login or attack attempts.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.DS — Data Security

TestObserved resultVerdict
Fichier de configuration .env (/.env)Not accessibleCompliant
Dépôt Git exposé (/.git/HEAD)Not accessibleCompliant
Sauvegarde de configuration WordPress (/wp-config.php.bak)Not accessibleCompliant
Archive de sauvegarde (/backup.zip)Not accessibleCompliant
Export de base de données (/backup.sql)Not accessibleCompliant
Page phpinfo (/phpinfo.php)Not accessibleCompliant
Fichier .DS_Store (/.DS_Store)Not accessibleCompliant
Configuration du dépôt Git (/.git/config)Not accessibleCompliant
Dépôt SVN exposé (/.svn/entries)Not accessibleCompliant
Fichier de mots de passe .htpasswd (/.htpasswd)Not accessibleCompliant
Sauvegarde du fichier .env (/.env.backup)Not accessibleCompliant
Copie temporaire de wp-config.php (/wp-config.php~)Not accessibleCompliant
Sauvegarde de configuration PHP (/config.php.bak)Not accessibleCompliant
Export SQL (dump.sql) (/dump.sql)Not accessibleCompliant
Export SQL (database.sql) (/database.sql)Not accessibleCompliant
Journal de débogage WordPress (/wp-content/debug.log)Not accessibleCompliant
Journal d'erreurs PHP (/error_log)Not accessibleCompliant
Identifiants SFTP de l'éditeur (/.vscode/sftp.json)Not accessibleCompliant
Page d'état Apache (server-status) (/server-status)Not accessibleCompliant

Sensitive paths in robots.txt

Compliant

Why it matters: Robots.txt can give an attacker a map of technical directories; it does not protect them or prove they are accessible.

Method: Only the /robots.txt file is read; none of the declared paths are opened.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
robots.txt filePresent and analysedCompliant
Declared technical or confidential pathsNoneCompliant

Technical URLs in sitemap.xml

Compliant

Why it matters: The sitemap is read by Google and attackers alike: any test or administration page listed in it can be indexed and targeted.

Method: Only the /sitemap.xml file is read; none of the listed URLs are opened.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
sitemap.xml filePresent and analysedCompliant
Listed technical or confidential URLsNoneCompliant

crossdomain.xml policy

Compliant

Why it matters: A legacy crossdomain.xml file open to all allows third-party sites to read content from yours.

Method: Only the /crossdomain.xml file is read.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.AC — Access Control

TestObserved resultVerdict
crossdomain.xml fileAbsent (normal)Compliant

Public subdomains

Compliant

Why it matters: Every forgotten subdomain (old website, test tool) adds to your attack surface.

Method: Querying public certificate logs (Certificate Transparency).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
Subdomains identified3Compliant
New since the previous scanportail.exemple-logistique.beCompliant
No longer present since the previous scanNoneCompliant

Exposed services and ports

Requires correction

Why it matters: An administration service or database exposed to the Internet is a direct target.

Method: Passive lookup of Internet indexing data (Shodan InternetDB), with no port scanning from our servers.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.AC — Access Control

TestObserved resultVerdict
Open ports on 192.0.2.2480, 443, 3389Compliant
FTP (port 21)ClosedCompliant
Telnet (port 23)ClosedCompliant
SMB (port 445)ClosedCompliant
SQL Server (port 1433)ClosedCompliant
MySQL (port 3306)ClosedCompliant
Bureau à distance (RDP) (port 3389)OPENRequires correction
PostgreSQL (port 5432)ClosedCompliant
VNC (port 5900)ClosedCompliant
Redis (port 6379)ClosedCompliant
Elasticsearch (port 9200)ClosedCompliant
Memcached (port 11211)ClosedCompliant
MongoDB (port 27017)ClosedCompliant

Exposed AI interfaces and remote access

Compliant

Why it matters: A poorly secured AI interface, administration console or remote access service can expose data or provide an entry point. A visible port is an indicator to verify, not proof of the software in use.

Method: Matching ports already provided by Shodan InternetDB against those commonly used by Ollama, Gradio, vLLM and other web APIs, Streamlit, Jupyter, WinRM, administration consoles/SSL VPNs, Fortinet, OpenVPN and PPTP. No connections are made to these services.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.AC — Access Control

TestObserved resultVerdict
OpenVPN ou service similaire — port 1194Not flaggedCompliant
PPTP (VPN ancien) — port 1723Not flaggedCompliant
WinRM (administration Windows) ou un autre service — port 5985Not flaggedCompliant
WinRM over HTTPS (administration Windows) ou un autre service — port 5986Not flaggedCompliant
Gradio — port 7860Not flaggedCompliant
vLLM, une API d'inférence ou une autre application web — port 8000Not flaggedCompliant
console d'administration, VPN SSL ou application web — port 8443Not flaggedCompliant
Streamlit — port 8501Not flaggedCompliant
Jupyter — port 8888Not flaggedCompliant
console d'administration, VPN SSL ou application web — port 9443Not flaggedCompliant
Fortinet / portail d'administration ou VPN SSL — port 10443Not flaggedCompliant
Ollama — port 11434Not flaggedCompliant

Reputation (Google Safe Browsing)

Compliant

Why it matters: A site flagged as dangerous is blocked by browsers and drives customers away.

Method: Querying the Google Safe Browsing blocklist.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: DE.CM — Continuous monitoring

TestObserved resultVerdict
MalwareNot flaggedCompliant
PhishingNot flaggedCompliant
Unwanted softwareNot flaggedCompliant

Credential leaks (Hudson Rock)

Compliant

Why it matters: Credentials stolen from your employees' infected computers can be used to compromise your accounts.

Method: Searching for the domain in the database of machines infected with information-stealing malware (Hudson Rock, updated daily).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.AC — Access Control

Advanced email settings

Compliant

Why it matters: Strengthen email encryption and trust beyond SPF/DMARC.

Method: Reading _mta-sts, _smtp._tls and BIMI DNS records and the published DKIM key.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.PT — Protective technologies

TestObserved resultVerdict
DKIM key strength2048 bitsCompliant
MTA-STS (enforced encryption for incoming emails)ConfiguredCompliant
TLS-RPT (encryption reports)ConfiguredCompliant
BIMI (logo in email clients)Absent (optional)Compliant

Spam blocklists

Compliant

Why it matters: An email server on a blocklist has its messages marked as spam or rejected by your customers.

Method: Querying the SpamCop, PSBL and UCEPROTECT DNS blocklists for each address of your MX servers.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: DE.CM — Continuous monitoring

Domain name security

Compliant

Why it matters: Protects your domain against hijacking (domain theft, DNS redirection, fraudulent certificates).

Method: Reading DNS records (DS, CAA) and querying the registry (RDAP).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
DNSSEC (signing of DNS responses)EnabledCompliant
CAA (authorised certificate authorities)letsencrypt.orgCompliant
Transfer lockActiveCompliant

Abandoned subdomains

Compliant

Why it matters: A subdomain pointing to a deleted service can be taken over by an attacker to publish a fake site in your name.

Method: Reading subdomain aliases (CNAME) and checking that the target service still exists.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
Subdomains checked3Compliant

Exposed administration pages

Compliant

Why it matters: An exposed administration login page is subject to constant password attempts.

Method: Simply visiting each address, without any login attempts.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.AC — Access Control

TestObserved resultVerdict
Connexion WordPress (/wp-login.php)Not foundCompliant
Administration Joomla (/administrator/)Not foundCompliant
phpMyAdmin (base de données) (/phpmyadmin/)Not foundCompliant
Connexion Drupal (/user/login)Not foundCompliant
Page /admin (/admin/)Not foundCompliant
cPanel (hébergement) (/cpanel)Not foundCompliant

Public AI assistants and chatbots

Compliant

Why it matters: A third-party assistant may receive visitors' questions or documents: its presence must be known and governed, but does not constitute a vulnerability.

Method: Searching for Chatbase, Voiceflow, Botpress and Landbot signatures in the HTML already collected; no third-party scripts executed.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.GV — Governance

TestObserved resultVerdict
Signatures searched forChatbase, Voiceflow, Botpress, Landbot: none detectedCompliant

Centralised sign-in and cloud email

Compliant

Why it matters: Login portals centralise access to your systems: they must be inventoried, kept up to date and protected by MFA. Their visibility is normal and does not prove a weakness.

Method: Reading email DNS records and names in public certificates; no portals are opened and no authentication is attempted.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.AC — Access Control

TestObserved resultVerdict
Cloud emailMicrosoft 365Compliant
Portails SSO/ADFS visiblesportail.exemple-logistique.beCompliant
portail.exemple-logistique.bePublic name to inventory — MFA and patching to be confirmedCompliant

Trackers and consent (GDPR)

Compliant

Why it matters: Loading trackers without consent may result in penalties from the Data Protection Authority.

Method: Analysis of the homepage code (loaded scripts, consent tool).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.GV — Governance

TestObserved resultVerdict
Traceurs publicitaires / statistiquesMatomoCompliant
Consent bannerDetectedCompliant
Third-party service scriptsstats.exemple-logistique.beCompliant

Cookie security

Compliant

Why it matters: A poorly secured cookie can be stolen and used to impersonate a logged-in user.

Method: Inspection of cookies sent by the homepage and their security attributes.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.DS — Data Security

TestObserved resultVerdict
Cookies set on arrivalNoneCompliant

Website technologies

Compliant

Why it matters: Knowing which CMS and extensions are used helps you monitor vulnerabilities affecting them.

Method: Identification of signatures in the homepage code and headers.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
Technologies identifiedWordPressCompliant
Exposed WordPress plugins1 : Contact Form 7Compliant

HTTPS redirection and security.txt

Compliant

Why it matters: Visitors must always reach the site over HTTPS, and researchers who find a vulnerability must know whom to notify.

Method: Visit over plain HTTP and inspection of /.well-known/security.txt.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.DS — Data Security

TestObserved resultVerdict
HTTP → HTTPS redirectYesCompliant
security.txt fileContact : security@exemple-logistique.beCompliant
security.txt expiry date2027-10-01T00:00:00ZCompliant

Public website history (archive.org)

Compliant

Why it matters: A site's age reassures visitors; older archived versions may also reveal forgotten information.

Method: Consultation of the Wayback Machine's public archives.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
Earliest archived record2018-04-12Compliant

Domains impersonating yours

Compliant

Why it matters: Fraudsters register domains almost identical to yours to send fake invoices to your customers.

Method: Generation of plausible variants (typos, swapped letters, other extensions) and checks for their registration in public DNS.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: DE.CM — Continuous monitoring

TestObserved resultVerdict
Variants tested24Compliant

Public cloud storage

Compliant

Why it matters: Cloud storage left publicly accessible allows anyone to download your files.

Method: Inspection of public addresses for Amazon S3 and Google Cloud storage with names derived from your domain (no login attempted).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.DS — Data Security

Routing protection (RPKI)

Compliant

Why it matters: A signed network (RPKI) is protected against Internet traffic hijacking.

Method: Query of the RIPE NCC public database (RIPEstat).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.PT — Protective technologies

TestObserved resultVerdict
192.0.2.24 — 192.0.2.0/24 (AS64500)Signed and validCompliant

Malware hosting (URLhaus)

Compliant

Why it matters: A compromised website distributing malware is blocked by antivirus software and browsers.

Method: Query of the abuse.ch URLhaus database.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: DE.CM — Continuous monitoring

SPF lookup count (DNS queries)

Compliant

Why it matters: Beyond 10 DNS lookups, SPF is invalid: your emails risk being marked as spam and spoofing becomes possible again.

Method: Recursive count of the include, a, mx, exists and redirect mechanisms in the SPF record.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.PT — Protective technologies

TestObserved resultVerdict
SPF DNS lookups ≤ 103Compliant

Keys and secrets in public code

Compliant

Why it matters: An access key visible in your website's code can be used by anyone at your expense.

Method: Inspection of the homepage and its public scripts for known key formats (values masked in the report).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.AC — Access Control

TestObserved resultVerdict
Page and scripts analysed5 fichier(s)Compliant

Maintenance of detected software

Compliant

Why it matters: End-of-life software no longer receives security patches.

Method: Comparison of versions reported by the server against official end-of-support dates.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.MA — Maintenance

TestObserved resultVerdict
WordPress 6.8.3Version still maintained or not listed in our reference tableCompliant

Legal notices and privacy

Compliant

Why it matters: A BCE company number and privacy policy are expected on a Belgian business website (CDE, GDPR).

Method: Automated search of the homepage (indicative only, does not constitute legal advice).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.GV — Governance

TestObserved resultVerdict
BCE company/VAT numberFoundCompliant
Privacy policy linkFoundCompliant

External script integrity (SRI)

Compliant

Why it matters: An integrity hash prevents a compromised third-party server from injecting code into your website.

Method: Inspection of homepage script tags and stylesheets loaded from other domains.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.DS — Data Security

TestObserved resultVerdict
Protected third-party resources0Compliant

Guaranteed email encryption (DANE)

Requires correction

Why it matters: DANE allows mail systems to require encrypted communication with your genuine mail servers.

Method: Lookup of _25._tcp TLSA records for each MX server (public DNS).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.DS — Data Security

TestObserved resultVerdict
TLSA exemple-logistique-be.mail.protection.outlook.comAbsentRequires correction

IPv6 accessibility

Compliant

Why it matters: IPv6 is the modern Internet protocol encouraged by the EU (a modernisation indicator, not a vulnerability).

Method: Lookup of AAAA records for the website and mail servers (public DNS).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.AM — Asset Management

TestObserved resultVerdict
Website (AAAA)AccessibleCompliant
Mail exemple-logistique-be.mail.protection.outlook.comAccessibleCompliant

DNS server redundancy

Compliant

Why it matters: If your only DNS server goes down, your website and email become unreachable.

Method: Reading the domain's NS records and their addresses (public DNS).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.PT — Protective technologies

TestObserved resultVerdict
At least 2 name servers3 serveur(s)Compliant
Distinct addresses3 adresse(s)Compliant
Separate networks2 network(s)Compliant

Hosting country (GDPR)

Compliant

Why it matters: Knowing where your data is hosted is expected under GDPR and NIS 2, and by insurers.

Method: Indicative geolocation of website and mail server addresses (RIPEstat / GeoLite).

CyFun® (CCB) framework: ID.GV — Governance

TestObserved resultVerdict
Site exemple-logistique.beBECompliant
Mail Microsoft 365NLCompliant

Form submission destinations

Compliant

Why it matters: A form submitted over HTTP or to an unknown domain can expose data entered by your visitors.

Method: Reading form submission addresses (action) in the homepage source code.

CyFun® (CCB) framework: PR.DS — Data Security

TestObserved resultVerdict
Homepage formsNo submissions to external addressesCompliant

Subdomains identified (3)

portail.exemple-logistique.be · webmail.exemple-logistique.be · www.exemple-logistique.be

04

Fixed this month

  • Certificat SSL arrivant à expiration· exemple-logistique.be
  • Fichier de sauvegarde publicly accessible· exemple-logistique.be
Method: passive, non-intrusive external analysis. Scoring scale: critical −25, high −10, medium −4, low −1.
CyberSure · info@cybersure.be · +32 495 75 85 70 · BCE BE 1005.721.833